KHARKIV — According to President Vladimir Putin, Russia is not at war.
So it may have been a surprise to many Russians living near the Ukrainian border when they were invaded by foreign soldiers.
“Dear Vladimir Vladimirovitch [Putin], we the residents of the Russian Federation, Kursk Oblast, Sudzhansky District, we are contacting you,” pleads a middle-aged woman standing amid a crowd of dozens of civilians, in a video circulating on Russian social media. “On the 6th, foreign troops with NATO equipment entered our land… Our relatives, husbands and neighbors are defending Donbas [in Ukraine]. We lost our lands, we lost our homes. Please help us… Please send someone… Please help us get our lands back.”
In a surprise attack begun in the early hours of Aug. 6, Ukrainian forces crossed the border and seized territory in Kursk Oblast — the first time Russian land has been occupied by a foreign army since World War II.
For months, Russia has been inching forward across eastern Ukraine in what it calls a “special military operation,” sacrificing tens of thousands of soldiers to grind out territorial gains against their outnumbered foes. Meanwhile, far from the frontlines, daily life for Ukrainians has become ever harder as the Kremlin’s missiles, bombs, and drones target infrastructure, while Kyiv mobilizes tens of thousands of additional soldiers and cracks down on those seeking to dodge the draft.
But war by any name is an unpredictable beast. Few expected Ukraine had the ability or desire to invade Russia — apparently not even Moscow.
Kursk sits along Ukraine’s northern border, about 300 miles south of Moscow, and much of what is happening there remains shrouded in the fog of war.
“As of now, we control about 1,000 square kilometers [about 390 square miles] of the territory of the Russian Federation,” said Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s top military commander, in a video briefing posted on Telegram by President Volodomyr Zelenskyy. “The troops are fulfilling their tasks. Fighting is ongoing actually along the entire front line. The situation is under our control.”
“The Kyiv regime has undertaken yet another large-scale provocation,” declared Russian President Vladimir Putin in a moment of irony, given it was he who ordered the invasion of Ukraine, and whose military is now two-and-a-half years into an operation originally projected to take three days.
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov said in a cabinet meeting on Aug. 7 that a cross-border attack by about 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been stopped, and that his forces were “continuing to destroy the adversary in areas directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border.”
Throughout the war, Ukrainian special operations forces have crossed into Russia, in small-scale hit-and-run attacks played up for their propaganda value. That’s not what is happening now.
“It’s not a raid. This is something different,” former Ukrainian defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk told reporters. Independent analysts estimate the operation in Kursk is something different, and may involve substantial forces — portions of seasoned mechanized and air assault brigades, and piecemeal battalions equivalent to somewhere around 10,000 soldiers.
The Russian government, seemingly caught flat-footed by the invasion, has declared a “counterterror operation” to stop it, and is rushing reinforcements to the scene. These forces have been placed under the control of the FSB, or Federal Security Service.
“They’ve subordinated the militarily sound, effective response to political considerations,” George Barros, the Russia team lead at the Institute for the Study of War, a non-profit research organization based in Washington, D.C., tells Rolling Stone. The FSB, responsible for internal security, “lacks the requisite organization and experience to conduct efficient combined arms operations,” Barros says.
This may complicate Moscow’s efforts to dislodge the Ukrainians. It is, after all, difficult to simply arrest a battalion of unfriendly mechanized infantry.
For operations in Ukraine, Moscow has relied on professional soldiers, mercenaries, and draftees who “volunteer” to take part in the “special military operation.”
But Putin has resisted using conscripts outside of Russia, a political decision aimed at placating popular opinion amid the war’s extreme casualties — some estimates put Russian losses at nearly half a million since the war began. Even an autocrat has constituents, and while Moscow is unperturbed about spilling the blood of volunteers, Putin is wary of the political backlash that may ensue if tens of thousands of teenage conscripts are sent to their deaths.
As a result, conscripts have generally been assigned relatively safe tasks inside Russia.
Like guarding the border.
This is why veteran Ukrainian fighters are now capturing large groups of surrendering Russian conscripts in Kursk.
“The first enemy forces that the Ukrainians ran into were FSB border guards. And then conscript units serving within Russian territory, according to Russian law,” Barros says.
Quickly bypassing the lightly manned defensive lines along the international border, Ukrainian reconnaissance units have now been seen as far as 20 miles inside Russia.
Ukrainian forces have released videos indicating they may be in control of Sudzha, a town of about 5,000 people on the road to Kursk, the provincial capital. They have also shown drone footage of columns of hapless Russian reinforcements being destroyed by long-range precision artillery.
There is evidence of Ukrainian soldiers and equipment being destroyed in Kursk, as well.
The ultimate goal of Ukraine’s operation is unclear. If it was intended to relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces defending against Russian advances elsewhere, that already appears to be working. One example, Barros says, is Russia redeploying an elite paratrooper unit to Kursk from the Kherson front, on the far southern end of the frontline in Ukraine. A Ukrainian defense official also told Politico that Putin had ordered some troops to be pulled out of Ukraine to defend Kursk.
Ukraine may also hope to seize territory for use in eventual negotiations, although to do this will require more substantial forces than are already involved. Or it may be a strategically symbolic move.
By Aug. 12, Russian officials said that more than 150,000 civilians had fled the fighting in three regions bordering Ukraine while it conducts the “counterterror operation.”
This would be a familiar experience on the other side of the border.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine is at war.
Here, no corner of daily life is untouched by the conflict. It’s been a difficult year, and there are signs everywhere that Ukrainian morale is flagging.
Shortly before the 11pm curfew in Kharkiv, the power is out. The streets of Ukraine’s second-largest city are ink-dark and eerily quiet. The air-attack warning siren just finished sounding, but it lingers in the mind beside visions of shattered high-rises and pock-marked concrete, spattered with the telltale scars of explosive fragmentation.

Small spheres of illumination float across uneven curbs and cobblestones as a handful of revelers navigate home from now-shuttered bars by the dim light of their phones, rushing to beat curfew. On one corner, the headlights of a turning car flash across the pavement, and a surreal sight springs from the darkness.
It’s an elderly woman standing silently with a bouquet of flowers.
Her name is Galina Viktorovna, 72 years old, and in her buttoned-up raincoat, dress, and tight bun, she is the embodiment of the archetypical babushka. She’s been selling flowers in the street for seven years. Neither bombs nor blackouts will stop her.
Isn’t she afraid to stand on a dark street during an air alert, curfew just minutes away?
“Not really,” Galina says, clutching fresh-cut irises, a bucket at her feet. “I live nearby, and will stay until the last minute. Someone may still come along and buy the last of my flowers.”
It seems unlikely. But life is anything but normal in Kharkiv these days, and Galina says she needs the money to make ends meet.
This is just 20 miles from Russia’s border, and in mid-May, Russian forces began a massive attack threatening the city. Ukraine rushed thousands of soldiers north to hold the line, and stopped Russian forces cold by July. It’s the second time the Russians tried to encircle Kharkiv during the war, and it’s the second time they’ve failed.
The renewed fighting brought dozens of villages back into the fighting. In the weeks preceding the assault, as Russian forces were building, authorities ordered mandatory evacuations in areas surrounding the city. That meant tens of thousands of villagers had to leave their homes, most moving into temporary shelters set up in Kharkiv proper — where they joined more than 200,000 internal refugees already in the city.
Understandably, not everyone wants to leave their home, even when ordered to do so.
“It’s terrifying, the term ‘mandatory evacuation,’” says Natalia Serhiyenko, the founder of the non-profit Unity and Strength, which works to fill in gaps in essential services being provided to families in frontline areas. “People think that soldiers and police are going to come and take them away, and just drop them off somewhere. But it’s not the case. There are established evacuation routes, shelters, and support.”
Russia stepped up its air attacks in concert with its ground offensive. On some days, the air alerts could last as long as 16 hours. The attacks destroyed an electricity plant — one of Ukraine’s largest — that powered the city. Officials estimate it will take upwards of a year to repair and bring back online. Kharkiv is known for its engineering, machinery, and electronics industries. The power loss brought the city’s economy to a standstill.
“Kharkiv is dangerous, but it’s still infinitely safer than many of the frontline villages,” Serhiyenko says. Volunteers from her group regularly travel to areas near the frontlines providing basic medical services, food and charging stations. “Here we are prepared. Things are quite efficient now” she says, despite the rolling power outages.
Russia’s goal this year has been to complicate the strategic picture for Ukraine. Despite the successful surprise in Kursk, the situation is grim not just in Kharkiv, but also in the eastern region known as Donbas where Russian forces have advanced within a few miles of Pokrovsk — a key road-and-rail hub that Ukrainian forces use to supply their forces.
Since the beginning of the year, Russian strategic air attacks have been dismantling Ukraine’s economy. Central to that has been the methodical destruction of energy infrastructure. The result has been a summer of tribulation.
Power outages are common. During the worst periods of the summer, it wasn’t unusual to spend 12 hours or more per day without power in major cities like Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv
Ukrainians have had to adjust to living without air conditioning amid heat waves, to working without internet and electricity, and to cellular towers being overloaded with demand. Smartphones are often reduced to little more than e-readers with flashlights, thundering diesel generators blot out conversation on the street as restaurants and cafes try to carry on their trade, and shops are often cash-only, their contactless payment terminals and card readers useless without power.
Streets that were already perilous with aggressive drivers have become lethal with unpowered traffic lights. In the wake of one egregious accident involving a motorcyclist racing through an intersection with unlit traffic signals, locals joked the rider was just trying to avoid mobilization.
And mobilization is a hot topic. Last month, life became even more restrictive for males under 60 who had not updated their information at the local draft office. Under martial law, there have long been checkpoints to verify draft documents, and police regularly visit houses to deliver military summonses. These efforts have increased as Kyiv seeks to mobilize as many as 200,000 additional soldiers. For any male over the age of 25, failure to produce valid draft registration can land you a seat on a bus, taking you straight to an army training camp.
Mykola — not his real name — is a 21-year-old student at the Odesa Maritime Academy. He has wanted to become a merchant seaman and travel the world since he was a boy. He’s already started on his tattoos; two full sleeves of traditional sailor’s ink stand in contrast to the barista’s apron he wears making coffee at a kiosk, to earn spending cash. He will graduate in a year, and is ready to pack his bags and go to sea.
Except he can’t. Men under 60 are not allowed to leave the country.
“I don’t know what the war will be like next year,” Mykola says. “Maybe I will have to join the army if I stay. Or maybe I can get someone to smuggle me across the border, and can find work on a ship somewhere.”
Maybe. The word on the street is that you can pay someone to get the right papers to go abroad. It seems unlikely. Men leaving the country officially are rare enough that males automatically get pulled off of buses and trains at border checkpoints, their documents examined in detail, and Ukraine has a relatively advanced electronic immigration system.
The word on the street is also that you can pay as much as US$10,000 to get smuggled out of the country. That seems more likely. Certainly in Odesa, corruption and smuggling networks existed before the war. But it’s risky: The SBU, Ukraine’s national security service, regularly posts videos of men getting arrested trying to flee the country.
Revised regulations tightened loopholes, and draft-dodging is now much harder than it was at the start of the war. Military-aged males cannot renew passports overseas without special exemptions, and every male was required to update their mobilization status by July 16. Failure to do so means, among other things, your bank accounts can be frozen and it is illegal to employ you. It also means if you are stopped by one of the draft patrols, you run the risk of being summarily sent to the military.
Still, there are some who take the chance: Maksym — a pseudonym — works in IT for an overseas company. He says he’s trying to stay off the books and lay low — but not so low he can’t be found hanging out on the patio of a restaurant in Odesa, drinking beer with friends in the sweltering evening.
“I’m a patriot, but I don’t want to go into the army and have these corrupt bastards put me in some unit full of losers where I am doing something useless until I get killed,” Maksym says, his English honed by long days talking to foreign clients on the phone. “I give money to military units. I help them buy drones. I donate to wounded soldiers. I’m more useful here than I would ever be in the military.”
He shows off a draft exemption for a falsified medical condition that he says he purchased for about US$3,000. “If they decide to examine me, it probably won’t work. But it should be enough that they leave me alone on the street.”
While it’s hard to say how many “Maksyms” are out there, enthusiasm for mobilization isn’t especially high — one study by a public broadcaster said 60 percent of Ukrainians have a negative perception of draft offices. A major issue is that soldiers who have already been mobilized have no guarantee about when they will be demobilized.
But the vast bulk of Ukrainians have complied with the new regulations, some selflessly and others fatalistically.

Back in Kharkiv, Viktor Viktorivich, who is probably in his 80s but says he is “always 16,” sits in a public square in front of a new shopping mall. With a long flowing white beard, clad in white clothes and a flat cap, he is surrounded by pigeons as he plays a music box. He spent his life in the Soviet Army as a medic; many of his friends died in Afghanistan. He has relatives in Moscow. He hasn’t spoken to them since the war started.
“I sit here and play this music box to bring people joy,” Viktor says, slowly turning the crank on the box while feeding the pigeons around him. “We all need something to brighten these dark times, and this is something I can do.”
His son is serving in the Ukrainian military. Viktor hasn’t seen him in months, but hopes he will be granted leave soon.
Soldiers who do get to go home find cities transformed by war.
Moscow says Kharkiv is a Russian city. Lately Russia started using glide bombs — some with warheads as big as 3,000 pounds — to prove their point. These are dropped by aircraft operating deep behind Russian lines, and are a fraction of the price of a ballistic or cruise missile. With a small radar signature and no propulsion system to hone in on, they are extremely difficult to intercept.
In the lead-up to the May offensive, Kharkiv suffered more than 200 aerial attacks in six months, killing more than 149 people. Now the bombs and missiles fall even more frequently. In July alone, Ukraine experienced the most monthly air attacks in two years, with 219 killed and more than 1,000 wounded, according to the UN. About a quarter of Kharkiv’s buildings have been damaged or destroyed.
But somehow, life goes on. Kharkiv, with many well-regarded universities and a strikingly beautiful city center, always had a reputation as a party town. That hasn’t changed.
P’yana Vyshnia — the name means “Drunken Cherry” — is a bar located near the entrance to an underground walkway. It’s part of a chain based in Lviv that sells a cherry-based liqueur, sort of like a fortified sweet red wine. There are locations across the country. On a summer night, the scene at the one in central Kharkiv is more like a festival than a pub.
Musicians play guitars and sing on the steps to the underground. There’s dozens standing outside, talking, laughing, and drinking in small groups. Drunks and homeless people weave through the crowd caging cigarettes or asking for change. Babushkas hopefully peddle their wares: DVDs and trinkets. A Roma boy of maybe 12 waits beside the door, trying to convince patrons to buy woven bracelets in blue and gold, the colors of Ukraine.
There is a feeling of desperation in the merry-making. It’s easy to party like tomorrow will never come, when missiles and bombs can drop out of the sky at any moment. It doesn’t come across as defiance, or even hopefulness — just a survival mechanism.
Groups of teenage girls take selfies, capturing moments of manufactured joy and sending them out into the ether as if to say: We’re young, beautiful, and having a good time. To hell with the war.
Two middle-aged drunks pester a young girl. She’s in a flowered blouse that leaves her shoulders bare, out on the town, waiting alone for her friends. The drunks can barely stand, their words to her a slurry of incomprehensible innuendo.
A 20-something off-duty soldier with a buzzcut and tight jeans revealing hours spent in the gym watches the scene unfold, growing visibly angry. His shirt says “California,” with the number 86 on it — a portent perhaps, if you’ve worked in a bar. He’s sober, clean, and strong, and he’s not having it.
Buzzcut walks over and pushes one of the drunks off the girl. The other suddenly awakens to the danger, and drags his friend away. The soldier checks with the damsel he’s rescued, seeking moral license to teach the drunks a lesson. She laughs nervously, shaking her head.
Buzzcut departs slowly, glaring defiance and shouting a profane quip at the drunks. A wave of laughter rolls through the scene. The drunks don’t notice.
Not everyone’s a Galahad in skinny jeans.
Another soldier is on medical leave. He proudly shows a scar from a head wound, saying he was almost killed by a sniper. The wounded soldier is many drinks into his evening, and it doesn’t take long for him to get out of control. He switches rapidly between aggression toward random strangers, and openly weeping while trying to relate his experiences — a whirlwind of emotion and commotion.
Word gets around that the wounded man is just back from the front, and the patrons tolerate his behavior with a surprising degree of patience. No one will countenance taking a swing at a soldier with a head wound, no matter how boorishly drunk.
A police patrol arrives, with three hard-looking men carrying battered wooden batons. A goon squad. The burly cops immediately clock the dynamo of trouble. They move to confront the wounded soldier. The staff intervenes, placating the fuzz while the troublemaker is physically carried away from the scene by his friends.
The power is cut, and the street is bathed in darkness.
A generator kicks in, and lights come back on at Drunken Cherry, to the cheers of the crowd — a beacon of life in a sea of darkened, empty buildings with boarded-up windows.
The wine flows, and life goes on into the night. Until curfew anyways.
It’s good the party is so close to an underground shelter. The merrymakers may need it if the missiles come.
The war is still here.













The Rise of the Digital Oligarchy
On Jan. 11, 1994, I drove to UCLA’s Royce Hall to hear Vice President Al Gore deliver the keynote address at the Information Superhighway Conference. I was in the early stages of building Intertainer, which would become one of the first video-on-demand companies. The 2,000 people crowded into that auditorium did not know it, but they were crossing a threshold. The roster of speakers read like a who’s who of industrial power: TCI’s John Malone, Rupert Murdoch, Sony’s Michael Schulhof, Barry Diller of QVC. These were among the richest and most commanding figures in American communications. Today, their combined force and fortunes are a rounding error beside Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Peter Thiel, Jensen Huang, Jeff Bezos, and Marc Andreessen. The world the Hollywood moguls walked back out into would not, in any meaningful sense, be the world they had left.
Gore’s UCLA speech now reads like a confident moment in the early‑Clinton fantasia of managed modernization: the assumption that a lightly guided market, properly “incentivized,” could be coaxed into building a new civic commons. He framed the whole project as a public utility constructed with private capital, insisting that “the nation needs private investment to complete the construction of the National Information Infrastructure. And competition is the single most critical means of encouraging that private investment.” What is striking, in retrospect, is not the technophilia but the blithe certainty that “competition” would safeguard pluralism and access, that state‑designed market rules would prevent the emergence of bottlenecks and private tollbooths. The actual trajectory of the internet — toward a stack dominated at each layer by a handful of firms from carriers to platforms to ad brokers — renders the scene almost allegorical: an administration hymning competition as the guarantor of openness while midwifing, in practice, the consolidated, quasi‑monopolistic order that would eventually narrow and privatize the very public sphere it imagined itself to be creating.
For 150 years since the Industrial Revolution, Americans had trusted that science and technology would bind the nation together, just as railroads and the telegraph had once compressed its continental distances. The historian John P. Diggins observed that “whereas the very nature of politics in America implied division and conflict, science was seen as bringing forth cohesion and consensus.” That faith was about to be tested to destruction.
Within two years, Gore and Newt Gingrich collaborated to pass the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and buried inside it was a provision — Section 230 — that would prove more consequential than anything else in the bill. It granted the new platforms a liability shield unavailable to any other business in America: immunity from responsibility for the content their users generated, moderated, or amplified. The effect was to hand the architects of the digital age a license to build without obligation. Welcome to the Wild West; the platforms own the sheriff.
What followed was an era of rapacious accumulation. In 1994, the largest company in America by market capitalization was Exxon, valued at $34 billion. Today, Google is worth $3.7 trillion. And when Donald Trump took the oath of office in January 2025, flanked by the very technocratic elite whose fortunes had grown beyond all precedent, the possibility loomed that the preceding 10 years was crystallizing into a name: techno-fascism — an authoritarian, corporatist order in which a narrow caste of technocratic elites deploys digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence to automate governance, intensify surveillance, and erode democratic accountability, all while presenting their dominion as the neutral application of expertise.
For the past decade I have written about the almost theological divide between two competing creeds. The gospel of nostalgia promises to “make America great again” — its default logic being that the America of the 1950s, when white men’s assumptions went unchallenged by people of color, women, immigrants, or queer individuals, was a more stable and legible world worth recovering. The gospel of progress, as Andreessen has written, holds that “there is no material problem — whether created by nature or by technology — that cannot be solved with more technology.” Its default logic is simpler: stop complaining. Flat wages, rising social media–induced mental illness, falling homeownership, a warming planet — perhaps, but at least we have iPhones. But the philosopher Antonio Gramsci had foreseen this dialectic in 1930: “The old is dying and the new cannot be born. In this interregnum many morbid symptoms appear.”
After the Republican midterm disappointments of 2022, Thiel called for a party that could unite “the priest, the general, and the millionaire”— a formula that reads, with hindsight, as a precise blueprint for Trump’s second administration: Christian nationalism, military force deployed at home and abroad, and a financial oligarchy powerful enough to steer the state. By the election of 2024, the gospel of nostalgia and the gospel of progress had concluded a short-term bargain to elect Trump. The result is the rise of an oligarchy of fewer than 20 American families.
The Copernican Moment
A deep unsettlement runs beneath our society today. Just as Nicolaus Copernicus displaced the Earth from the center of the cosmos, we are now displacing the human from the center of consciousness. New discoveries about cognition in other animals and organisms — octopuses dreaming, bees counting, trees retaining memory of drought — suggest, as Michael Pollan has written, that thought and feeling are not human monopolies but properties of life itself. The first Copernican revolution humbled our astronomy; the second threatens to humble our very being.
Yet the revelation carries its twin anxiety. If mind is no longer our exclusive inheritance, what becomes of that inheritance when machines begin to mimic it? Artificial intelligence poses not merely a technical challenge but a metaphysical one. It asks whether consciousness can exist without vulnerability — without the pulse and jeopardy of a life that can be lost. The Portuguese neuroscientist Antonio Damasio reminds us that the brain evolved to serve the body, that consciousness begins in feeling. Machines, however elaborate, know no hunger, no pain, no desire. To be conscious in the human sense is to participate in necessity — to be held by one’s own fate.
The real danger is not that machines will become like us, but that we will become like them: efficient, unfeeling, exquisitely programmable. A people habituated to passivity and optimized for consumption may eventually forget the work of building a world together. What once belonged to politics — the imaginative labor of collective destiny — has been quietly surrendered to the corporate logic of the algorithm. The result is not enlightenment but enclosure: a society awake to everything except itself.
This interregnum, then, is not a pause but a rupture — a suspended time in which institutions still stand yet no longer persuade, in which the future arrives in forms no one quite intended. What began for my generation as the optimistic dream of a communications revolution has matured into a general condition of American life: a digital oligarchy adrift between orders, armed with enormous power but uncertain whom, or what, it serves. Some of us glimpsed the terrible risk when it was still only a risk — that the principles of kleptocracy would become America’s own. That grim vision is now arriving, in real time, in the person of Trump. As David Frum wrote in The Atlantic, “The brazenness of the self-enrichment now underway resembles nothing from any earlier White House, but rather the corruption of a post-Soviet republic or a postcolonial state.” And the techno-fascist oligarchs are at the trough, waiting to be fed.
The Age of Surveillance and Simulation
The first clear sign that the promise of the digital commons had curdled came with Edward Snowden’s disclosures in 2013, when Americans learned that Google and Facebook had opened their back doors to the security state. What had been marketed as an architecture of connection revealed itself also as an infrastructure of monitoring.
By the mid-2020s, the fear had hardened into habit. A 2025 YouGov survey found that nearly a quarter of Americans admitted to censoring their own posts or messages for fear of being watched or doxxed. Surveillance no longer needed a knock at the door. The mere awareness of a watching eye did the work. What had been a public square had become, almost imperceptibly, a panopticon of self-restraint.
Into this apparatus stepped a new class of private overseers. Palantir, the data-mining firm Thiel co-founded, grew from a counterterrorism instrument into a generalized engine for correlating personal information — tax filings, social media traces, the bureaucratic exhaust of ordinary life. Insiders warned that data citizens had surrendered to the IRS or Social Security for basic governance could be recombined for far more intrusive purposes. The point was not simply that we were being watched, but that we were being rendered legible — sorted, scored, and classified in ways invisible to us. As Anthropic’s CEO Dario Amodei told The New York Times, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure is effectively nullified by AI:
It is not illegal to put cameras around everywhere in public space and record every conversation. It’s a public space — you don’t have a right to privacy in a public space. But today, the government couldn’t record that all and make sense of it. With AI, the ability to transcribe speech, to look through it, correlate it all, you could say: This person is a member of the opposition — and make a map of all 100 million. And so are you going to make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment by the technology finding technical ways around it?
We are witnessing the first serious moral battle of the AI era, and its front lines run straight through the boardrooms of Silicon Valley. Anthropic drew them first. The company refused to allow its systems to be turned on the American public in the name of security and declined to let the Pentagon wire its AI into autonomous weapons capable of identifying and killing without human authorization. To the Defense Department, accustomed to purchasing compliance along with contracts, the idea that a vendor might set moral limits on military use was borderline insubordinate. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth designated Anthropic a supply-chain risk to national security. President Trump, on Truth Social, called the company “radical woke” and ordered federal agencies to stop using its technology. Anthropic had been, in effect, blacklisted for conscience.
What happened next revealed something important about the moral landscape of the AI industry. OpenAI, which had publicly positioned itself as sharing Anthropic’s red lines — Sam Altman insisted his company, too, opposed mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons — moved swiftly to fill the vacuum. While Anthropic was being frozen out of Washington, D.C., OpenAI quietly negotiated and signed a deal of its own with the Pentagon, granting the Defense Department access to its models for deployment in classified environments. OpenAI then published a blog post with a pointed aside: “We don’t know why Anthropic could not reach this deal, and we hope that they and more labs will consider it.” The company that had stood shoulder to shoulder with Anthropic in principle had, in practice, used Anthropic’s exclusion to capture the contract.
The backlash was swift — and came from inside the house. Caitlin Kalinowski, who had led OpenAI’s hardware and robotics teams since late 2024, publicly announced her resignation. Her statement, posted on X and LinkedIn, was brief and precise: “AI has an important role in national security. But surveillance of Americans without judicial oversight and lethal autonomy without human authorization are lines that deserved more deliberation than they got. This was about principle, not people.”
The formulation was careful, almost scrupulously fair to her former colleagues. But the substance was damning. A senior technical executive, one who had spent her career building the physical systems through which AI meets the real world, had concluded that OpenAI had crossed lines it had publicly promised not to cross — and had done so without the internal deliberation those lines deserved. Some users canceled their ChatGPT subscriptions in protest. Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, became the number-one free app in the Apple App Store, displacing ChatGPT. The market, in its way, had registered a verdict.
What the episode exposed is the hierarchy of pressures operating on every AI company at this moment. Altman’s public statements and OpenAI’s private negotiations inhabited different moral universes, and the gap between them is a measure of how quickly principle buckles under the combined weight of government contracts, competitive anxiety, and the intoxicating proximity to power. Hegseth and Trump have sent the clearest possible signal: Companies that draw lines will be punished; companies that erase them will be rewarded. The outcome of this first moral battle of the AI era will do much to determine the shape of every battle that follows.
But erasure, in this case, is not incidental — it is the business model. The questions that seem separate — who controls the weapons, who watches the citizens, who owns the culture, whose labor trains the machine — are in fact a single question, asked of us all at once: whether humanity will remain the author of its own story, or be quietly written out of it.
The Technocracy’s Bargain
Artificial intelligence functions in this landscape not only as a tool, but also as an ideology. The systems that now summarize our news, grade our tests, and generate our images are built entirely from accumulated human expression, yet are heralded as replacements for the slow, wayward work of thought. By design they remix rather than originate; they automate style while evacuating risk. The consequence is a flood of synthetic prose and imagery that feels like culture but carries none of the scars of experience. Anyone with a prompt can simulate the surface of artistry, further collapsing the distinction between the crafted and the merely produced.
We need to insist on the human self as something more than a flicker of circuitry or an echo of stimulus — to hold that our consciousness is not reducible to mechanism, that our art, our music, our capacity for beauty and sorrow carry a dignity no machine can counterfeit. We need to imagine a future in which humanity still governs its own creation — not as the object of its inventions, but as their author and their measure. A world that offers consumption in place of purpose courts a different and more corrosive kind of unrest.
The outlines of that unrest were already legible by the middle of the decade. In labor reports and think-tank bulletins one could trace the quiet unmaking of the white-collar world. Young graduates, credentialed and deeply indebted, were discovering that the jobs they had trained for no longer existed in familiar form; whole categories of administrative and creative work were being absorbed by AI or retooled around its efficiencies. Commentators spoke of an “AI job apocalypse” not as metaphor but as demographic fact — an educated stratum slipping downward, its ambitions collapsing into precarity. History offers a warning: When a surplus of the educated meets a scarcity of opportunity, turbulence and unrest follows. The clerks and interns of the knowledge economy can become the dissidents of a new era.
But many of the technocrats already sense what is coming and prefer to prepare their escape. They buy compounds in New Zealand, secure airstrips in remote valleys, fortify estates on distant islands stocked and wired for siege. The gesture betrays everything: They, too, expect the storm. They simply mean to watch it from a safe distance — beyond the reach of the graduates, the strivers, the displaced millions who will inhabit the world their machines made. In that distance — the gap between those who build exits and those who have nowhere to go — the interregnum takes on its most recognizable shape: a society waiting, with gathering impatience and anger, for a new settlement that has yet to arrive.
Sean O’Brien, president of the Teamsters, said something recently about AI and labor that hangs in the air like a change in pressure: For once, those who have never known economic danger are about to feel what it means to be exposed — to live without insulation from the market’s weather. According to The New York Times, “The unemployment rate for college graduates ages 22 to 27 soared to 5.6 percent at the end of last year.”
For 30 years, the country has drifted ever further from the world of things. The old economy of matter — of tools, factories, and physical production — was gradually exchanged for an economy of signs. We learned to believe that the future belonged to those who trafficked in abstractions: the managers of systems, the manipulators of symbols, the custodians of information. That belief became the moral core of the professional class. To think was noble; to make was obsolete.
For decades, the professional class watched the industrial world hollow out and mistook the spectacle for confirmation of its own permanence. It confused exemption with destiny. Now, the correction is arriving — not from the shop floor, but from the circuits.
This is one meaning of the interregnum: a pause in which the old class myths no longer align with material reality, and no new story has yet cohered. In the space between, people who once felt like authors of the future are discovering that they were also characters, written into a script whose logic they did not fully control.
Yet another path exists, if we can summon the imagination to take it. Rather than waging a doomed Luddite resistance, we might seek a grand bargain with the architects of the new order — entering into direct negotiation with Big Tech over the political terms of the transition. The question is not whether AI can be stopped; it cannot. The question is whether its spoils can be shared.
How much of the immense stream of revenue flowing through the platforms and hyperscalers could be redirected toward a sovereign fund, a common dividend for those whose labor has been displaced? Anthropic’s Amodei has suggested a tax of three percent of AI revenues to seed the sovereign fund. It is a moment that calls less for purity than for negotiation — an uneasy but deliberate partnership between humanists and technologists, aimed at keeping a frustrated graduate class from becoming the raw material of a larger revolutionary breakdown.
Marshall McLuhan believed that new media were creating “an overwhelming, destructive maelstrom” into which we were being drawn against our will. But he also believed in a way out. “The absolute indispensability of the artist,” McLuhan wrote, “is that he alone in the encounter with the maelstrom can get the pattern recognition. He alone has the awareness to tell us what the world is made of. The artist is able [to give] … a navigational chart to get out of the maelstrom created by our own ingenuity.”
Our great inquiry now must be: How do we quit the politics of national despair — a maelstrom that our own ingenuity has created? It will be hard, because a vast media industry depends on your engagement with its outrage. Three companies — X, Meta, Google — monopolize the advertising revenue that flows from that outrage. Seventy-eight percent of Americans say these social media companies hold too much power. To break the spell, we need to understand the roots of the phony culture war they have cultivated — and remember that America has had a real promise. Only when we recover that memory can we begin to imagine what the new promise of American life might look like.